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ABSTRACT 
Failure of multiple components due to a common cause represents one of the most 
important issues in evaluation of system reliability or unavailability. The frequency of such 
events has relatively low expectancy, when compared to random failures, which affect 
individual components. However, in many cases the consequence is a direct loss of safety 
system or mitigative safety function. For this reason, the modeling of a common cause failure 
(CCF) and its presentation in fault tree structure is of the uttermost importance in probabilistic 
safety analyses (PSA). 
During the past decade, PSA model of Krško NPP has undergone many small changes 
and a couple of major ones in fulfilling its basic purpose, which was serving as a tool for 
providing an appropriate information on the risk associated with actual plant design and 
operation. All changes to Krško PSA model were undertaken in order to make it a better tool 
and / or to make it represent the plant in more accurate manner. The paper provides an 
overview of changes in CCF modeling in the fault tree structure from the initial PSA model 
development till present. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Common cause failures, a subset of the general class of dependent events, are defined as 
multiple failures of components from shared root cause. The key characteristic of a common 
cause event is that two or more components must be affected by a single, shared cause that 
must not be failure or functional unavailability of another component [1]. 
CCFs included in plant logic models represent those intercomponent dependencies 
which are not considered to be potentially significant, and whose mechanisms are not 
explicitly represented in plant logic model (event tree/fault tree). Specific dependent failure 
mechanism should be explicitly modeled whenever possible and it is advisable to make a 
clear distinction between the coverage of such modeling and the scope of CCF analysis [2]. 
CCFs are an important class of dependent events with respect to their contribution to 
system unavailability. This is indeed important for redundant and / or diverse systems. 
Analyses for such systems that only consider coincidental independent failures are likely to 
grossly underestimate system unavailability and will provide misleading indications of the 
benefits of redundancy and diversity in system design. 
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During the past decade, PSA model of Krško NPP has undergone many small changes 
and a couple of major ones in fulfilling its basic purpose, which was serving as a tool for 
providing an appropriate information on the risk associated with actual plant design and 
operation. All changes to Krško PSA model were undertaken in order to make it a better tool 
and / or to make it represent the plant in more accurate manner. This section provides an 
historical overview of changes in presentation of CCF in the fault tree structure from the 
initial PSA model development till present. Three stages can be distinguished, each of which 
is separately described in further sections. 
 
 
1.1  Common Cause Failure Models 
Many models have been proposed for the evaluation of common cause failures. Those 
that are typically used in PSAs belong to the classes referred to as parametric models or shock 
models. More details about CCF models can be found in [3]. The European CCF benchmark 
exercise and Scandinavian benchmark exercise both showed that the choice of CCF model is 
not important if a consistent set of data is used [1]. In the paragraphs that follow, the Basic 
Parameter Model is first briefly introduced, which is the most general form of the commonly 
used parametric models. Next, a particular re-parameterization of that model, called the 
Multiple Greek Letter (MGL) Model, is briefly described. The MGL model is employed in 
Krško PSA [4].  
In Basic Parameter Model a set of parameters commonly denoted Qk
(m) is defined. The 
k
th parameter represents a probability of a basic event involving k specific components 
(1 ) in a common cause component group of size m. The model is based on symmetry 
assumption that the probabilities of similar basic events involving similar types of 
components are the same. Q
m k ≤ ≤
k
(m) can be defined as demand-based or time based (standby 
failure rates and failure rates during operation) depending on the system modeling 
requirements. Having in mind the assumption on symmetry, the total failure probability, Qt, of 
component in a common cause group of m components can be written as: 
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In MGL model, parameters Qk
(m) are expressed in terms of the total component failure 
probability, Qt, which includes effects of all (independent and common cause) contributions 
to that component failure, and a set of failure fractions used to quantify the conditional 
probabilities of all possible ways a CCF of component can be shared with other components 
in the same group, given that component failure has occurred. Specifically: 
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where ρ1 = 1,  ρm+1 = 0  and ρi  , i = 2,...,m,  is conditional probability that the cause of 
a component failure that is shared by i-1 components will be shared by i or more additional 
components, given that i-1 specific components have failed. Greek letters are assigned to 
these conditional probabilities as follows: ρ2 = β, ρ3 = γ, ρ4 = δ, …  
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In the case that m = 2, the MGL model collapses into "Beta Factor Model" with Q1
(2) = 
(1-β)Qt  and Q2
(2) = β Qt , which is found to be suitable for CCF groups with 2 components 
[3]. 
The Beta Factor Model can be applied to groups with m > 2 as well, in which case it 
comes to the basic assumption that if common cause failure appears then all m components 
are failed. In terms of Eq. (2) this means:  ρ1=ρ2=...=ρm-1=1,   ρm=β   and  ρm+1=0  as before. 
One general assumption adopted in Krško PSA is that redundancy of order higher than 
4 is not credited for. Having in mind Eq. (2), this would mean that, for an eventual group with 
m > 4 :  ρ5=ρ6=...=ρm-1=1. 
 
2  COMMON CAUSE FAILURES IN INITIAL KRŠKO PSA FAULT TREES 
The initial Krško PSA model, developed within the frame of Individual Plant 
Examination (IPE), was contained in traditional PSA tool, which did not have any specific 
capabilities related to handling the CCF model in fault trees [4]. In IPE PSA the failures of 
equipment due to common causes were represented in the fault trees explicitly by means of 
dedicated basic events. Two types of modeling of CCFs were distinguished: modeling of CCF 
for groups with 2 components, and modeling of CCF for groups with more than 2 
components. 
All groups of components susceptible to common cause failures in particular plant 
system were identified by system analyst. Common cause failures for two-component groups 
were included in the fault trees directly in the process of their development. Contributions of 
common cause failures from groups with 3 or more components were included later, by CCF 
analyst, during the post-processing of system-level fault trees. The original, IPE, CCF fault 
tree models for two-component groups and those for groups with 3 and more components are 
described in the two sub-sections that follow. 
 
2.1  Groups with Two Components 
The common cause contribution of each particular CCF group of two components was 
modeled in system fault tree in explicit manner. For each group appropriate single basic event 
was defined, which was in the fault tree attached to both components from respective group. 
This CCF-related basic event contributed to the failure of the component like any other failure 
mode which disables a specific component (e.g. individual random failure, failure of support 
system or unavailability due to test or maintenance). Speaking in terms of fault tree logic, the 
CCF-related basic event was “OR-ed” to the basic event representing individual random-
failures of component A and to the basic event representing random-failures of component B. 
The concept is shown in Figure 1.  
For quantification of CCF of two components Beta Factor Model, described above, was 
used and representative basic event was quantified accordingly. Each CCF basic event for 
two-component group in IPE PSA model had a link toward one of the two individual random 
failure basic events (events “A” and “B” in Figure 1) and toward beta factor parameter in the 
Master Data Base. During the quantification process these two links have been used to 
produce a probability of CCF basic event in an automatic manner. 
 
2.2  Groups with More Than Two Components 
The tool used for the development of IPE PSA did not employ any feature for handling 
the CCF groups with more than two components in automatic manner. Hence, the only 
approach available was to perform the explicit fault tree modeling. However, as the size of a 
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CCF group increases, the complexity of a fault tree model expands exponentially. The 
example for a CCF group with three components (A, B and C) is shown in Figure 3. 
In order to prevent fault trees from getting too complex and to reduce the modeling 
effort, a simplified approach was taken toward modeling of CCF for groups of more than two 
components. In this approach all contributions from various CCF groups within particular 
system were captured by a single basic event attached to system-level top logic in the fault 
tree structure. The method involves an evaluation of the fault tree cutsets by CCF analyst, an 
identification of which cutsets may be susceptible to dependent failures, a calculation of 
common cause contributions and adding representative basic event directly into the fault tree 
model. 
 
SYSTEM FAILS
Train A fails Train B fails
Component A fails Component B fails
Individual (random)
failures of component A
Individual (random)
failures of component B
Component A & B fail
due to common cause
Component A & B fail
due to common cause
A CCF B CCF
 
Figure 1:  Fault Tree Model of CCF for Two-Component Group 
 
As already mentioned, all CCF groups with 3 or more components were identified 
during the system fault tree analyses. System fault trees were then developed with no account 
for common cause failures of 3 or more components in an explicit manner. Once a fault tree 
for a particular system was developed, its minimal cutsets were generated and evaluated as a 
part of consistency checking. They contained basic events representing CCFs of two-
component groups, since these were included in the fault tree during its development, as 
described above. 
Generated system-level cutsets were then subjected to a screening process, performed 
by the CCF analyst, in order to identify those cutsets that are to be “marked” as susceptible to 
CCF of more than two components. Similar cutsets from one system fault tree were grouped 
together. The process is illustrated by a simple system of three redundant components A, B 
and C with its fault tree representation conceptually shown in Figure 2. The post processing 
for this simplified example is illustrated by Table 1. 
A “marked” cutset generally contains a product of an independent individual failure(s) 
of components that are not members of CCF group and at least two independent individual 
failures of components that are part of the same CCF group. For instance, minimal cutset “j2” 
in Table 1 is a product of basic events representing individual random failures of components 
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A and C from considered CCF group, and a basic event representing failures of support 
system to component B, which does not belong to the group. 
 
 
Contribution from components'
individual or their support failures
SYSTEM FAILS
Failure of component A
(individually) or its support
All common cause faillure
contributions
Individual failure
of component A
Failure of support
for component A
Failure of component B
(individually) or its support
Failure of component C
(individually) or its support
qq   SUP-A
Q 
CC-TOTAL
A
X
Individual failure
of component B
Failure of support
for component B
qq   SUP-B
B
Individual failure
of component C
Failure of support
for component C
qq SUP-C
C
   
Figure 2: CCF modeling for a group of three components in the initial Krško PSA 
 
For each marked cutest “ji” an additional probability, QCCji, had to be calculated to 
account for common cause contribution. Assuming k components from a group of size m in a 
considered cutset, an additional failure probability would be term  (Eq. 2) multiplied by 
the probabilities of remaining basic events from the cutset. The procedure was repeated for all 
marked cutsets “j
) (m
k Q
i” and all values QCCji summed up, which resulted in probability QCC-TOTAL. 
This probability was then assigned to a representative basic event “OR”-ed to the top-level 
system fault logic in the fault tree (basic event designated X in Figure 2). The procedure is 
illustrated in Table 1. 
 
Table 1:  Post-processing of Minimal Cutsets for the Example from Figure 2  
 
Cutset  #  Constituents 
(Basic Events) 
Probability  CCF Contribution to Be Added 
(QCCji) 
 
…  …  … …   
j1  A × B × SUP-C  q
2·qSUP-C  C SUP C SUP
CC
AB q Q q Q − − ⋅ = ⋅
) 3 (
2    
j2  A × SUP-B × C  q
2·qSUP-B 
B SUP B SUP
CC
AC q Q q Q − − ⋅ = ⋅
) 3 (
2    
j3  A × B × C  q
3  ) 3 (
3 Q Q
CC
ABC =    
…  …  … …   
     ∑ = −
i
i
j
CCj TOTAL CC Q Q    
 
 
One obvious disadvantage of this approach is that the common cause contribution is not 
part of the “living” fault tree model. Another one is that certain components’ combinations 
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and respective contributions of CCF may be omitted in the case that screening did not go 
deeply enough. 
 
3  TRANSFER OF KRŠKO PSA MODEL INTO THE RISK SPECTRUM 
ENVIRONMENT 
In the years to follow the completion of IPE, Krško undertook the transfer of IPE PSA 
into Risk Spectrum [6] environment in order to facilitate its dynamic use in variety of 
applications, which were planned to be carried on in the near future. The purpose was 
improving analyzing capability, as well as manageability of the model's structure. Risk 
Spectrum (RS) was known to be amongst the most advanced integrated PSA tools suitable for 
the variety of applications. The transfer of the overall internal event PSA into another 
environment, which was followed by adding the existent external event PSA models (i.e. 
seismic, internal fires and internal floods) into one integrated structure, was very complex 
task and a real challenge. It had to be performed in two major steps: direct conversion and 
optimization. 
Thus, the next stage of CCF modeling in Krško PSA fault tree structure was entered by 
a direct conversion of Krško PSA model into the format of RS. The direct conversion had to 
be performed in a gate-for-a-gate (and event-for-an-event) manner. In this process the 
probabilities of IPE CCF-related basic events were transferred into the RS without the 
information on their constituents. This could have been only a temporary solution for several 
reasons. 
One is that it made it very inconvenient for parameter updates within the Living PSA. 
All other basic event probabilities are re-calculated automatically. However, a probability of 
each 2-component CCF had to be re-calculated manually with taking appropriate care to use 
adequate β and adequate random failure parameter. 
Another reason is that having a CCF probability as a basic parameter does not allow for 
appropriate uncertainty propagation through the model. Namely, propagation of uncertainty in 
RS assumes independence of parameters. 
Thus, the only convenient way, having in mind future applications, was to remove the 
IPE CCF basic events and rebuild CCF models in fault trees by means of RS CCF groups. 
4  KRŠKO PSA MODEL OPTIMIZATION 
The direct conversion of internal events PSA model into RS was only the first (and 
easier) step in its transfer into RS-based tool for applications. The second step was 
optimization of directly converted structure. It involved re-arrangement of fault tree structure 
by employment of house events, which lead to its significant reduction and improved 
accessibility. As a part of the optimization, the re-modeling of directly transferred CCF 
models was overtaken. 
Risk Spectrum is a new-generation PSA analysis tool with automated CCF modeling 
capabilities [6]. It facilitates grouping of random failure basic events into CCF groups and 
performs automated expanding of CCF groups in the process of Boolean resolution and 
generation of minimal cutsets. Each CCF group of m components consists of m respective 
basic events with assigned individual random failure probabilities and defined CCF model 
with appropriate parameters. (Beside Beta and MGL, Risk Spectrum also supports so-called 
Alpha Model, [6], [3].) Whenever an analysis of the fault tree is performed (i.e. generation of 
minimal cutsets), each of the basic events classified as a member of CCF group that appear in 
the fault tree structure is automatically replaced by an OR-gate (CCF gate) with all CCF 
events involving that basic event (including event itself). For instance, in Figure 3, which 
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illustrates expanded three-component group, basic event A is replaced by a CCF “OR”-gate 
with inputs “A” (individual random failure of A), “CC-AB” (CCF of A and B), “CC-AC” 
(CCF of A and C) and “CC-ABC” (CCF of A, B and C). 
 
COMPONENT B FAILS
SYSTEM FAILS
B CC-ABC CC-AB CC-BC
COMPONENT A FAILS COMPONENT C FAILS
C CC-ABC CC-AC CC-BC A CC-ABC CC-AB CC-AC
 
Figure 3: CCF modeling for group of three components in present Krško PSA 
 
Re-modeling of directly converted IPE CCF models in the fault tree structure was done 
in the following major steps ([8], [9]): 
-  for each existing IPE CCF basic event in fault tree structure identify underlying 
CCF group of components based on system analysis notebook; 
-  for each CCF group identify representative individual random failure basic events 
in the fault tree structure and appropriate MGL parameters from CCF-notebook; 
-  establish RS CCF groups in the PSA model and remove existing IPE CCF basic 
events; 
-  compare the minimal cutsets at various levels and evaluate differences, if any. 
 
Evaluation and comparison of minimal cutsets was done for consistency-check and in 
order to validate the re-modeling. The differences in final results were small (several percents 
of baseline core damage frequency value). They were attributable to the methodological 
differences of two approaches and features of two underlying PSA tools. First of all, it must 
be recognized, that the IPE approach to quantify contributions of CCFs from more than two 
components was an approximation, while the calculations based on RS CCF groups represent 
the exact mathematical application of MGL method. Applying the latter introduces a number 
of minimal cutsets containing combinations of CCFs from groups of three and more 
components that were not present in the original list. Beside this, there were also some other 
issues which contributed to the final difference, such as the fact that, while generating 
minimal cutsets, Risk Spectrum multiplies probability values of individual random failure 
basic events by factors of type "1 - β", which was not the case in IPE PSA calculations. 
5 CONCLUSION 
The paper has presented an historical overview of changes in presentation of CCF in the 
fault tree structure of Krško PSA model from the initial model development till present. Three 
main stages were described. The process resulted, in its third stage, in establishing the CCF 
fault tree model based on built-in Risk Spectrum features, which will suite Living PSA 
program and various PSA applications in an appropriate manner. It will also enable 
incorporation and propagation of MGL parameter uncertainty. 
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